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Abstract: Character judgments play an important role in our everyday lives. However, decades of 
research on trait attribution have shown that these judgments are prone to a number of biases and 
cognitive distortions. This raises a skeptical worry about the epistemic foundations of everyday 
characterological beliefs that has some deeply disturbing implications. I argue that this skeptical 
worry is misplaced: under the appropriate informational conditions, our everyday character-trait 
judgments are in fact quite trustworthy. I then propose a mindreading-based account of trait 
attribution that explains both why these judgments are initially unreliable, and how they eventually 
become more accurate. 
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1. Introduction 
A young woman returns home from a first date. “How did it go?” Her roommate asks. “I didn’t like 
him,” she replies. “He was arrogant and closed-minded.” “Sounds like a real jerk,” the roommate 
says sympathetically. 
A search committee discusses their impressions of a job candidate. “I thought she was quite 
brilliant,” one committee member says. “She seemed very sociable, like she would get along well 
with the faculty,” another adds. They conclude that the candidate would be a great fit. 
Over lunch, two friends argue over whether they should support a political candidate. “She seems 
dishonest and cold,” one friend complains. “That’s just how she’s been portrayed by her 
opponents,” the other disagrees. “If you read her book or listen to her interviews, it’s clear that she 
genuinely cares about people.” 
Judgments of character like these pervade our everyday social interactions. In our friendships, in our 
work, in our politics, we play close attention to the character traits and dispositions of those around 
us. Many of these judgments are about specifically moral traits like honesty and compassion, others 
are about epistemic traits like wisdom, while still others are about more evaluatively neutral traits 
such as extraversion. Often, these judgments arise quite quickly during a first impression, and are 
based on subtle non-verbal cues from a person’s face and body language. But as we get to know a 
person, we continue to build upon and refine our knowledge about her character. Some of our most 
confidently held beliefs are about the traits of those with whom we are most intimately acquainted, 
such as our spouses, immediate family members, and close friends.  
But can these judgments be trusted? A survey of some of the most prominent findings in the 
empirical literature on trait attribution and person perception would seem to suggest otherwise. 
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According to this body of research, our ordinary character judgments are riddled with a host of 
biases that lead us to attribute character traits on the basis of superficial or erroneous evidence. Most 
prominent among this list of biases is the “fundamental attribution error” (FAE), which leads us to 
leap to characterological or “dispositional” interpretations of observed behavior, even in cases where 
obvious contextual or “situational” factors would provide an equally good or better explanation 
(Gilbert et al., 1995; Jones & Harris, 1967; Ross, 1977). To the FAE, we may also add a suite of 
other social biases and heuristics that lead us to infer character traits on the basis of stereotypes and 
physical appearance (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2002; Todorov, Olivola, Dotsch, & Mende-Siedlecki, 
2015). Collectively, these biases cause us to rely upon a naïve dispositionalist theory that predisposes 
us to see behavior as the product of global character traits, regardless of whether this inference is 
warranted (Ross & Nisbett, 2011). Let us call the idea that these biases render our ordinary 
judgments about global character unreliable attributional skepticism (henceforth, AS). 
AS is distinct from situationism, another skeptical thesis about character traits. Famously, the leading 
proponents of situationism have argued that the stable and cross-situationally consistent “global” 
character traits posited in both Aristotelian virtue ethicists and in our ordinary folk discourse do not 
actually exist (or are at least very rare); rather, they claim that most of us possess “local” character 
traits that vary widely as a function of the situations we find ourselves in (Doris, 2002; Harman, 
1999). AS and situationism both imply a similar epistemic conclusion: ordinary folk beliefs about 
character rarely rise to the level of knowledge. Indeed, many situationists have also invoked AS as 
part of an error theory about why it is that we believe that people possess global traits, even though 
almost none of us really do (Alfano, 2011; Doris, 2002, pp. 92–106). But while situationism is a 
thesis about the metaphysics of character traits, AS is a thesis about the epistemology of character-trait 
judgments. These two theses come apart: although situationism seems to entail some version of AS 
(how else to explain the persistent belief in global traits?), AS does not imply situationism, and is 
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even compatible with a realist view of global traits. That is, a proponent of AS could agree that 
global traits really exist, and that they can be measured with the right psychometric instruments, 
such as the Big Five personality questionnaires. However, the proponent of AS could still insist that 
our ordinary folk practices of character-trait attribution are ill-suited to track these real psychological 
properties. We are, in short, poor judges of character. 
Although it is compatible with realism about character, the skeptical challenge posed by AS is every 
bit as troubling as the one posed by situationism, and has many disturbing implications for both 
ordinary and philosophical thinking about character. For example, a common way to think of moral 
responsibility is to view character-inconsistent actions as less blameworthy than character-consistent 
ones (Frankfurt, 1971; Watson, 1975) – hence the exculpatory force of declarations like, “He was 
not himself!” But if our intuitive judgments about character are unreliable, then so are these 
judgments of moral responsibility. AS would also be problematic for moral theories that instruct us 
to look to the examples set by virtuous individuals for normative guidance, such as Linda 
Zagzebski’s exemplarist virtue ethics (Zagzebski, 2017): if we take our cues from perceived moral 
exemplars, but our ability to identify these exemplars based on their characters is untrustworthy, 
how can we know that we are following the correct moral example? More generally, any normative 
theory that requires us to accurately judge a person’s traits will be threatened by AS. 
But more viscerally, AS implies that we usually do not truly know other people – even those whom 
we love deeply. If AS is right, then we cannot trust even our most confidently held beliefs about 
other people’s character traits – not about our romantic partners, siblings, parents, best friends, co-
workers, or anybody else. This is a profoundly alienating conclusion. In the news, we often hear the 
friends and family members of violent criminals express deep confusion and bewilderment upon 
learning that someone they thought they knew could do something so monstrous. “I guess you can 
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never really know a person,” they sometimes say. AS suggests that this is true across the board. For 
these reasons, it is important to set AS apart from situationism, and evaluate it on its own merits.  
In this paper, I will argue that in spite of the evidence for AS, we should not lose faith in our folk 
attributions of character. Although our ordinary character judgments are sometimes based on certain 
heuristics and biases, they are nevertheless generally reliable when judged against appropriate 
standards. I will begin by reviewing the empirical case for AS in a bit more detail, and argue that it 
fails to support broad skepticism about our character judgments. Next, I present evidence from the 
literature on accuracy in personality judgment that our ordinary character judgments are in fact quite 
reliable under the right informational conditions. I then turn to the task of explaining how this 
evidence for accuracy can be reconciled with the evidence for error in trait attributions that 
motivates AS. To do this, I offer a theory of the underlying cognitive processes that ground both 
reliable and unreliable character judgment, which, I will suggest, are a part of our capacity for 
reasoning about mental states, or “mindreading.”  
1.1. The nature of character traits 
First, however, I must say a few words about the scope of this paper, and its starting assumptions 
about the nature of character traits. To isolate the specific challenge posed by AS, it is necessary to 
clearly distinguish it from the kind of skepticism about character judgment that follows from 
situationism. If situationism were true, then AS becomes trivially true as well. If realism about global 
traits were true, however, then the truth of AS would remain an open question. Thus, discussion of 
AS is much more dialectically interesting given some form of realism about global traits. There are, 
moreover, many compelling reasons to doubt the empirical merits of situationism (Jayawickreme, 
Meindl, Helzer, Furr, & Fleeson, 2014; Paris, 2016; Sabini & Silver, 2005). Briefly, much of the 
empirical evidence cited in favor of situationism ultimately fails to support it. For example, 
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situationists have often pointed to the Good Samaritan and Milgram experiments as demonstrating 
that compassion is determined by situational factors (Darley & Batson, 1973; Milgram, 1963). Yet 
these studies only report effects averaged across populations of individuals, and are not capable of 
measuring stable individual differences in behavior across contexts, which is the core of the global 
theory of traits (Jayawickreme et al., 2014). Situationists have also cited findings showing that 
individual behavior varies significantly between one situation and the next (Hartshorne & May, 
1928); however, these findings fail to reflect the strong cross-situational patterns of behavior that 
emerge when we aggregate over a large number of observations (Epstein, 1979; Fleeson & 
Jayawickreme, 2017). Perhaps the greatest challenge to situationism comes from the vast body of 
evidence within personality psychology supporting the existence of the Big Five1 trait dimensions, 
which are significant predictors of major life outcomes such as academic achievement, mental and 
physical health, job performance, and length of life (Noftle & Robins, 2007; Ozer & Benet-Martínez, 
2006; Paris, 2016). In short, there is very good evidence for the existence of global traits, and very 
poor evidence for situationism. Therefore, a starting assumption of this paper will be that global 
traits do indeed exist, and that situationist challenges to the global character thesis fail. 
Going forward, I will be taking it for granted that the Five Factor model of personality (or perhaps a 
related model such as HEXACO (Ashton & Lee, 2007)) provides a descriptively accurate 
approximation of the characterological dimensions along which people exhibit stable differences. 
More specifically, I will be adopting a theoretical approach to personality traits known as “Whole 
Trait Theory” (Fleeson & Jayawickreme, 2015). According to this view, trait terms refer to stable 
intraindividual distributions of cognitive, affective, motivational states, which tend to produce 																																																								1	The Big Five trait dimensions are Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism (or 
Emotional Stability); they are sometimes abbreviated to the acronym OCEAN. Each trait dimension is comprised of a 
number of trait “facets” (e.g. the facets of Agreeableness are trust, straightforwardness, altruism, compliance, modesty, 
and tender-mindedness), which in turn break down into various sub-facets, giving the Big Five a hierarchical structure 
(John & Srivastava, 1999).	
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characteristic patterns of behavior in trait-relevant situations (c.f. Mischel, 2004; Mischel & Shoda, 
1995; Snow, 2010). For example, the trait of extraversion has been shown to partly consist in the 
habitual pursuit of certain types of goals, such as the having fun, making new friends, and getting 
others to do what you want; the trait of conscientiousness consists partly in the habitual pursuit of 
goals like completing tasks and using one’s time efficiently (McCabe & Fleeson, 2012, 2016). In 
other words, the Whole Trait Theory postulates that the descriptive and predictive adequacy of the 
Big Five are explained by regularities at the level of her intentional mental states. Thus, in what 
follows, a belief of the form “S has character trait T” will be true just in case S is disposed to 
manifest a T-like distribution of psychological states over time. Reliable trait judgment consists in 
the capacity to engage in true trait attributions in a consistent manner.  
On this model, the possession of a particular trait is consistent with the observation that people 
exhibit a great deal of intraindividual variability. For example, it is not unlikely that a moderately 
extraverted person will, over the course of a week, think, feel, and behave in ways that are consistent 
with both extreme extraversion and extreme introversion (Fleeson, 2001). But from week to week, 
or month to month, this same person will reliably manifest the same mean levels of extraverted 
states, and the same general distribution of extraversion-relevant behaviors (Fleeson, 2001; Fleeson 
and Gallagher, 2009; Heller et al., 2007).2 Less technically, one can think of the relation between 
traits and manifestations of trait-relevant psychological states as analogous to the relation between 
climate and weather: the latter describes noisy, highly variable phenomena on shorter time scales, 
while the former describes broad, stable patterns that only emerge on longer time scales. 
Finally, note that the ensuing discussion concerns “character traits” in a broad sense. It is meant to 
include both normatively relevant traits such as moral and epistemic virtues and vices, and 																																																								
2 As reported using experience-sampling measures. Notably, mean levels of these self-reported “personality states” 
strongly correlate with global self-reported trait ratings (Finnigan & Vazire, 2018; Fleeson & Gallagher, 2009).  
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personality traits such as extraversion and open-mindedness. Other authors draw more fine-grained 
distinctions between these categories (e.g. Miller, 2014), but for present purposes a broad brush will 
suffice.  
2. Attributional skepticism 
By far the strongest evidence in support for AS comes from the study of the fundamental attribution 
error (FAE), which is the tendency to over-attribute the causes of behavior to intrinsic, dispositional 
factors while ignoring relevant situational factors. In a classic demonstration of this phenomenon, 
Ross and colleagues (1977) had their subjects participate in a quiz show game in which some played 
the role of “questioner,” while others played the role of “contestant.” The questioners were 
instructed to make up difficult questions that would be difficult for the contestants to answer. 
Afterwards, observers were asked to rate the intelligence of the questioners and contestants. Even 
though the contestant and questioner roles were arbitrarily assigned, and the questioners had a much 
easier task than the contestants, observers still generally rated the former as more intelligent than the 
latter. Observers, in other words, seemed to either not notice or discount the strong situational 
constraints on the behavior that they had just witnessed, and instead inferred that it transparently 
reflected the individual’s stable traits. This basic phenomenon has been replicated dozens of times, 
and has been referred to as one of social psychology’s most robust findings (Ross & Nisbett, 2011).3  
Numerous other findings suggest that we are very quick to attribute global traits to other people on 
the basis of very slim evidence. For example, we tend to make very rapid inferences about traits on 
the basis of a person’s facial appearance (Todorov, Said, Engell, & Oosterhof, 2008). Faces that 
appear older and more masculine tend to be seen as more dominant and powerful than faces that 																																																								
3 Notably, certain East Asian populations appear to be less prone to the FAE, although dispositional thinking is still 
common in these groups (Choi & Nisbett, 1998; Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999). 
	 9 
appear younger and more feminine. Faces with large, wide-set eyes tend to be seen as more 
trustworthy, while faces with small, narrow-set eyes are seen as less trustworthy. We also tend to 
view more attractive faces as more extraverted. These trait attributions are also made extraordinarily 
quickly, even when faces are only presented for 100 milliseconds (Todorov, 2013).  
Another pathway to rapid trait attribution comes via stereotypes (Westra, 2017). Intuitively, many 
stereotypes about social groups prominently feature characterological information, and one can 
easily call to mind examples of stereotypes about groups that are viewed as lazy, greedy, deceitful, 
aggressive, ambitious, intelligent, and so on. Researchers interested in the contents of stereotypes 
have discovered that these trait attributions frequently follow a common pattern. When analyzing 
stereotypes using two basic trait dimensions – the “warmth” dimension and the “competence” 
dimension – we find that most common stereotypes fall into one of four types, each picking out a 
distinct cluster of correlated traits (Fiske et al., 2002). High-warmth, low-competence stereotypes, 
for example, tend to include traits like compassion, friendliness, and trustworthiness, but also traits 
like low intelligence, frivolity, and clumsiness; low-warmth, high-competence stereotypes, in 
contrast, include traits like high intelligence and ambition, and also deceitfulness and greed. These 
clusters of trait attributions get associated with particular groups and become rapidly activated when 
we encounter cues that indicate a person’s group membership and influence our subsequent 
expectations about their intentions and behavior. 
There is also evidence that we spontaneously encode behavioral information in terms of 
corresponding traits, and bind this trait information to particular actors (Uleman, Adil Saribay, & 
Gonzalez, 2008; Uleman, Hon, Roman, & Moskowitz, 1996). Todorov and Uleman, for example, 
showed participants pictures of different actors paired with various trait-implying behavioral 
descriptions (e.g. “Alice solved the murder halfway through the book,” implying the trait “clever”) 
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(Todorov & Uleman, 2003). Participants were then shown the images again, paired with different 
trait words, and were instructed to say whether the word had appeared in the behavioral description 
paired with the face in question. They found that false recognition rates were highest when the 
actors’ faces were paired with trait words that fit the behavioral descriptions, even when exposures 
to the actors’ faces were brief and when participants were under cognitive load, suggesting that these 
“spontaneous trait inferences” or STIs are both rapid and cognitively efficient. 
In short, there is ample evidence that we are extremely quick to make inferences about traits on the 
basis of very superficial evidence, and that we also ignore other, relevant forms of counter-evidence 
that would otherwise undermine these inferences. Some situationists have argued that this is enough 
to cast doubt on the reliability of all of our ordinary judgments about traits. Alfano (2011) puts the 
point succinctly: 
The existence of these biases does not prove that no one has traits, nor does it demonstrate 
that no arguments could warrant the conclusion that people have traits. What it instead 
shows it that regardless of whether people have traits, folk intuitions would lead us to attribute traits to 
them [italics in original]. (Alfano, 2011, p. 133)4 
The crux of this argument is that our ordinary beliefs about people’s traits simply do not track their 
real psychological dispositions. Though these dispositions may well exist, we are not in an epistemic 
position to have any knowledge of them. While this view might allow that appropriate psychometric 
																																																								4 In addition to the FAE, Alfano (2011) argues that the false consensus effect specifically reinforces the FAE by leading 
us to believe that our intuitive trait attributions are widely shared. However, the false-consensus effect is a domain-
general bias, and there is no evidence that its effects on trait attribution are any greater than on any other belief that we 
falsely presume to be widely shared. Along similar lines, Alfano argues that various other domain-general biases (such as 
the confirmation bias) further degrade the reliability of our faulty trait attributions. But because these biases affect all 
sorts of reasoning, and not just inferences about traits, they cannot explain why our ordinary character judgments in 
particular should be viewed as unreliable.  
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instruments could justify certain global trait attributions, our everyday judgments are woefully 
inadequate for the task. 
3. In the long run, trait attribution is accurate 
While the empirical support for AS may seem compelling, the fact that we display systematic 
patterns of error in our commonsense trait judgments does not entail that they are generally 
unreliable. After all, many highly reliable psychological mechanisms are prone to systematic error 
under certain conditions. Our eyes fail us all the time when it’s dark out. Our ears don’t work 
particularly well when we’re in a loud concert. It’s hard to taste accurately immediately after eating 
something spicy. When informational conditions are poor, our senses fail us. But this fact does not 
lead us to treat the deliverances of our senses as inherently untrustworthy. Rather, we recognize that 
these mechanisms operate reliably within a certain range of informational conditions, and unreliably 
outside that range.  
I argue that the cases of faulty trait attribution invoked in support of AS are drawn from outside the 
range in which our trait judgments are normally reliable. In FAE scenarios, for example, participants 
are asked to make judgments about a stranger on the basis of a very limited set of observations. In 
spontaneous trait-attribution scenarios, participants rely on even less information: a one-sentence 
behavioral description. In face-based trait attributions, participants are literally asked to make 
judgments on the basis on facial appearance alone. But these are hardly adequate conditions for 
making an inference about a person’s traits. If by hypothesis traits are cross-situationally stable 
properties of individuals, then almost any inference about the presence of a trait based on single 
behavioral observations will be unreliable. To expect otherwise is just to have unrealistic expectations 
about the conditions under which trait attributions can be apt. A well-supported global trait 
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attribution should require numerous observations of the target in many different contexts.5 In short, 
measuring the reliability of trait attributions on the basis of single observations of behavior is like 
giving a person an eye exam in the dark, or a hearing test during a metal concert. Yes, our judgments 
in these contexts are unreliable. But this is neither surprising nor evidence for skepticism about these 
judgments more generally. 
3.1. Accuracy in personality judgments 
But when can we expect our trait attributions to be reliable? One very natural suggestion is that our 
folk judgments about traits are most likely to be accurate when we make them about people with 
whom we are well acquainted. While we may not be so reliable in our trait attributions about 
strangers, perhaps we are much better when it comes to judging the traits of our family members, 
romantic partners, and close personal friends. My beliefs about the traits of my brother, for instance, 
are based on a lifetime of observations and interactions with him. Indeed, sometimes our family 
members know us even better than we know ourselves. Or take the experience of dating: on a first 
date, we may form various first impressions about a person’s character that we subsequently revise 
after being romantically involved with them for several months or years; these later beliefs are 
almost always more confidently held than the earlier ones. This more advanced characterological 
knowledge plays a huge role in our everyday lives, and a crucial part in the maintenance of our most 
important relationships. Surely these beliefs about character are much more reliable – and more 
significant – than the superficial first impressions that form the basis for the skeptical worry outlined 
above. 
																																																								
5 A possible exception to this would be single observations of behaviors that are both unusual and highly diagnostic for 
an underlying trait. Witnessing someone torture a puppy, for example, is very good evidence that they are cruel, both 
because such behavior is quite rare, and because it is a strong indicator of cruelty (Uhlmann, Zhu, & Diermeier, 2014). 
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This proposal is borne out by a substantial body of research on accuracy in ordinary people’s 
personality judgments (Connelly & Ones, 2010; Funder, 1995; Kenny, 1991; Vazire & Carlson, 
2011). Whereas many psychologists researching “person perception” have focused on the various 
errors and biases that affect our beliefs about other people, accuracy researchers are most interested 
in the conditions under which we get these judgments right. When we shift our attention from error 
to accuracy, it becomes apparent that, for all our heuristics and biases, we’re actually pretty good 
judges of character.   
Different researchers operationalize “accuracy” in different ways, but in general, it is measured by 
looking at the degree of consensus between different third-party personality judgments (“other-
other agreement”), and the degree of correspondence between third-party and self-reported 
personality judgments (“self-other agreement”).6 In practice, these studies involve a target individual 
who fills out a standard personality test about herself, and a number of other “judges” who fill out 
the same test about the target. If these individuals are tracking the same underlying psychological 
properties, the reasoning goes, we should expect their judgments to correlate with one another; 
stronger correlations between the different test results are thus interpreted as reflecting greater 
accuracy. This approach should be familiar to philosophers of science: convergence across relatively 
independent observations represents what William Whewell called “a consilience of inductions,” and 
speaks to the reality of the underlying phenomenon being measured (Helgeson, 2013; Whewell, 
1989) – in this case, global traits. 
																																																								6	A few studies have used third-party personality judgments to predict specific behaviors, both in laboratory and 
naturalistic contexts, and obtained positive results (Fast & Funder, 2008; Funder, 1995; Vazire et al., 2010). However, 
these correlations observed tend to be somewhat weaker than those observed in self-other agreement and third-party 
consensus measures (Connelly & Ones, 2010). This is unsurprising: ordinary people display a wide range of variability in 
their trait-relevant behaviors throughout their day-to-day lives; trait-level regularities only appear when behavior is 
measured in an aggregate form (Epstein, 1979; Fleeson, 2001). Thus, even weak correlations between third-party trait-
attributions and specific behavioral outcomes are still notable. Still, for the purposes of argument, I focus here on 
consensus-based methods.	
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Of course, mere convergence is not enough to establish accuracy. If these personality judgments are 
really tracking actual traits, then the degree of convergence between them should vary as a function 
of evidential factors that ought to influence accuracy (Funder, 1995). For example, traits like 
extraversion have more transparent behavioral correlates, which should make them easier to 
observe, and thus elicit higher degrees of intersubjective agreement; in contrast, more “internal” 
traits, such as introspectiveness, lack obvious behavioral correlates, and therefore ought to elicit 
lower levels of agreement. Similarly, judges who have had more opportunities to observe a target 
(e.g. close acquaintances) ought to show greater agreement than those who have had less (e.g. 
strangers). The trait-relevance of the evidence a judge has should also matter: whether or not I know 
that you have a clean desk at work tells me a lot about how conscientious you are, but not a lot 
about whether you are “open to experience.” In other words, accuracy in personality judgment 
should lead to systematic variability in the correlations between different third-party judgments. In 
contrast, AS predicts that this variability should be insensitive to the appropriateness of different 
evidential factors. 
In a meta-analysis spanning 263 independent samples and 44,178 targets, Connelly and Ones found 
strong evidence that many of the above factors do indeed moderate the accuracy of personality 
judgments (Connelly & Ones, 2010). In particular, both self-other agreement and other-other 
consensus were strongest when the judges were intimate acquaintances of the target. This was most 
pronounced in dating partners and spouses, followed by other family members and friends, followed 
by work colleagues and casual acquaintances. These correlations were particularly strong for less 
“observable” traits, such as Agreeableness, Openness, and Emotional Stability. In contrast, more 
“observable” ones such as Extraversion exhibited stronger agreement and consensus among 
strangers and in the sample overall. In other words, the intimacy of a relationship between a judge 
and a target often translates into greater accuracy in global trait judgments, particularly for traits that 
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are hardest to infer. Thus, unsurprisingly, the better you know someone, the better you know her 
character. 
3.2. Objections 
One potential objection to this kind of methodology is that consensus and agreement might be 
tracking something other than real character traits. Widely shared stereotypes, for instance, would 
also generate consensus across judges, but seem unlikely to reflect judges’ sensitivity to targets’ 
unique personalities.  
But this cannot explain the pattern of results that we see in accuracy research. How, for instance, 
could stereotypes account for greater consensus among close personal acquaintances than strangers, 
since stereotypes are ex hypothesi widely shared? Accuracy researchers have also developed techniques 
for quantifying unique contributions of widely shared beliefs about personality versus personal 
knowledge of the target, which they label as “normative accuracy” and “distinctive accuracy,” 
respectively (Biesanz, West, & Millevoi, 2007; Cronbach, 1955). Roughly, normative accuracy 
measures the extent to which a judge’s personality ratings track the average personality ratings within 
the sample, while distinctive accuracy measures correlations between judges after controlling for 
normative accuracy. Consistent with the hypothesis that agreement and consensus are driven by 
judges’ actual observations of the targets, Biesanz and colleagues have found that distinctive 
accuracy increases the longer a judge knows a target, while normative accuracy does not. Thus, while 
widely shared beliefs about personality do account for some level of baseline consensus among 
strangers, additional gains in consensus reflect unique experiences of the target (Biesanz et al., 2007). 
A critic might also argue that ordinary personality judgments track outward performances of character 
that do not necessarily reflect deeper psychological realities. For example, a person may project an 
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outward image of extraversion, while secretly despising the company of others. Unlike the 
stereotype hypothesis, which explains consensus as the result of widely shared information, such 
performances of character would generate greater levels of agreement only among judges who have 
directly observed the target, such as more intimate acquaintances. This would explain why such 
individuals display more “accurate” character judgments, even though these judgments would not 
correspond to the target’s real character, which remains concealed.  
There are a few reasons to doubt this hypothesis. First, it implies that most people are constantly 
engaged in elaborate and lifelong acts of deception across all of their relationships. This is 
implausible. Second, there are telling asymmetries between self- and other-reported personality 
ratings that speak in favor of genuine trait tracking. For example, third parties’ judgments about 
highly evaluative traits (such as creativity and intelligence) tend to be more accurate predictors of 
highly desirable or undesirable life outcomes (e.g. work and educational outcomes, depression, and 
relationship satisfaction) (Luan et al., 2018; Vazire et al., 2010; Vazire & Carlson, 2011). In other 
words, people have blind spots about their own personalities (particularly when it comes to 
personally important traits) that third parties are better able to detect. Thus, even if our personalities 
were simply mere performances, these performances still reveal more about the performers than 
they themselves realize. 
Another potential objection to this argument comes from Jonathan Webber, who anticipates how a 
situationist might respond to the suggestion that trait judgments become more accurate with 
acquaintance (Webber, 2007). He suggests that accurate beliefs about the character traits of one’s 
loved ones could simply be due to familiarity with that person’s behavior in particular situations. On 
this view, increasing accuracy in personality judgments reflects a tacit capacity for tracking situational 
influences on behavior, rather than broad-based underlying dispositions.  
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However, accuracy in personality judgments appears to be robust across many different situations, 
insofar as it is robust across different kinds of relationship. Both siblings and romantic partners, for 
instance, show high levels of self-other agreement and other-other consensus. Both of these types of 
relationships are likely to reflect a fairly broad range of situational experiences with a person, 
compared with, say, a college dorm-mate or co-worker, whose personality judgments are generally 
less accurate. Moreover, the situations in which these high-acquaintance relationships take place do 
not completely overlap: your knowledge of your sibling’s character is derived from very different 
kinds of situations than your knowledge of your spouse’s character. Yet such judgments tend to 
show reliable correlations both with each other and with the self-ratings of the targets themselves. If 
judges were tracking situational factors rather than characterological ones, these correlations would 
be quite surprising.  
Overall, the evidence for accuracy in personality judgments provides an impressive counterpoint to 
the case for unreliability and error. While it is true that we are prone to many trait-attribution biases, 
the scope of this evidence is limited to a narrow and unrepresentative subset of the interactions in 
which we make character judgments. Under the right informational conditions, our character 
judgments are quite reliable. Arguably, these are also the conditions in which it is most important to 
us that we have accurate character judgments – namely, in our close personal relationships.  
4. To learn about character, we read minds 
One shortcoming of the preceding discussion is that the accuracy literature is silent about the 
cognitive bases for our trait judgments. When it comes to reconciling the evidence for error with the 
evidence for accuracy, this becomes a problem. Why, for instance, are we so prone to make hasty 
trait attributions? Why do we not simply refrain from making these judgments until we have 
sufficient evidence? And how is it that we transition from these rough and unreliable initial 
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inferences to fine-grained and accurate judgments as we get to know a person better? Though the 
threat of AS has been held at bay, many questions remain.  
4.1. Trait attribution and theory of mind 
The place to start, I suggest, is the nature of character traits themselves. As I stated in the 
introduction, traits are constituted by stable distributions of psychological states, which in turn 
produce trait-relevant behavior. Given this account of traits, it follows that reliable, accurate trait 
judgments will be those that track regularities in our underlying mental states. Accurate trait 
attribution should thus depend upon our ability to accurately reason about patterns in people’s 
mental states, a capacity known as “mindreading” or “theory of mind.”  
There is a large body of evidence suggesting that theory of mind and trait attribution are functionally 
related (for a review, see Westra (2018)). For example, there is both neuroimaging and behavioral 
evidence that we are able to dynamically update representations of people’s traits in response to new 
mental-state information, especially when this involves mental states that are inconsistent with a 
prior trait attribution (Cloutier, Gabrieli, O’Young, & Ambady, 2011; Kestemont, Vandekerckhove, 
Ma, Van Hoeck, & Van Overwalle, 2013; Ma et al., 2011). Inconsistent mental-state information also 
appears to moderate the tendency to commit the FAE: when we observe someone act in a trait 
consistent way, but for a trait inconsistent motivation, we do not attribute a corresponding trait to 
that person (Krull, Seger, & Silvera, 2008; Reeder, 2009; Reeder, Kumar, Hesson-McInnis, & 
Trafimow, 2002; Reeder, Vonk, Ronk, Ham, & Lawrence, 2004). Conversely, inferences about a 
person’s stable traits also appear to shape our beliefs about their mental states, such as whether or 
not we interpret a foreseeable side-effect of an action was intended or unintended (Sripada, 2012; 
Sripada & Konrath, 2011). The connection between trait attribution and psychological knowledge is 
also evident in childhood: by 15 months of age, children are able to use regularities in a person’s 
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emotional expressions combined with perceptual cues to make trait-like inferences about her 
expected behavior (Repacholi, Meltzoff, Hennings, & Ruba, 2016; Repacholi, Meltzoff, Toub, & 
Ruba, 2016). Around the same age that they start passing the false-belief task (Wimmer & Perner, 
1983), children start to be able to use linguistic trait labels to attribute desires and predict behavior 
(Heyman & Gelman, 2000; Liu, Gelman, & Wellman, 2007).7 In short, from childhood onwards 
representations of traits seem to shape our expectations about people’s psychological states and 
behavior, and information about mental states moderates inferences about their underlying traits. 
There is also tight functional integration between trait attribution and mindreading at the neural 
level, where both processes are supported by the same “social brain network” (Van Overwalle, 
2009). It also appears that mental state and trait representations share a common neural code. In a 
recent study employing multivariate pattern analysis or “neural decoding” techniques, Thornton and 
Mitchell found that a classifier trained on neuroimaging data of participants thinking about different 
traits (e.g. agreeableness) was then able to successfully predict when participants were making 
inferences about corresponding psychological states (e.g. happiness), suggesting that the brain uses a 
common representational space and population codes to individuate both stable traits and the 
transitory mental states that constitute them (Thornton & Mitchell, 2018). In other words, we seem 
to think about traits and mental states in a very similar way. 
Thus, it seems as though our social cognition is structured in a way that reflects the real metaphysical 
relationship between traits and mental states. One challenge in interpreting these results, however, is 
that most well-known theories of mindreading have not specifically considered the role of trait 																																																								
7 Interestingly, the tendency to commit the FAE in explanations of behavior emerges relatively late, around age 6 (Seiver, 
Gopnik, & Goodman, 2013). Discussing these findings, Meltzoff and Gopnik suggest that it reflects the emergence a 
higher order belief or “framework theory” about the probability that a given action reflects a person’s underlying traits 
(Meltzoff & Gopnik, 2013). Because the tendency to commit the FAE varies from culture to culture, they suggest that 
the acquisition of this higher order expectation may be moderated by environmental factors, such as adults’ use of trait-
based explanations of behavior.  
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representations (e.g. Butterfill and Apperly, 2013; Goldman, 2006; Nichols and Stich, 2003; 
Wellman, 2014). Recently, however, a number of authors working within the framework of 
predictive coding have begun to address this oversight (Bach & Schenke, 2017; Koster-Hale & Saxe, 
2013; Tamir & Thornton, 2018; Theriault & Young, 2018; Westra, 2018). The key insight of this 
approach has been to think of trait attribution and mindreading as two levels of representation 
within a broader, hierarchically structured system for action prediction. Tamir and Thornton (2018), 
for example, propose a top-down model of social cognition wherein character information 
represented in a low-dimensional trait space is used to generate predictions about a person’s likely 
mental states, which are represented in a parallel state space. This mental state information – along 
with priors about transitional probabilities between states – is then used to compute the person’s 
likely actions. Adopting a more Bayesian formulation of a similar idea, Westra (2018) has proposed 
that trait representations function as over-hypotheses (Kemp, Perfors, & Tenenbaum, 2007) that 
help us to assign prior probability distributions over the different possible mental states that a 
particular person might exhibit.8 For example, the belief that someone is ambitious might lead us 
think it is more antecedently likely that that person will have self-serving motivations rather than 
altruistic ones. These prior probabilities can then inform how we interpret particular actions that 
would otherwise be ambiguous between multiple intentional interpretations (e.g. when a self-serving, 
ambitious person makes a large charitable donation). In both of these models, traits play a similar 
role: narrowing down the space of possible mental-state hypotheses in order to help us generate 
person-specific behavioral predictions. 
As Westra (2018) notes, the superordinate position of traits within the hierarchy of psychological 
representations can help to explain our habit of making hasty trait attributions based on minimal 
																																																								
8 See also Meltzoff and Gopnik (2013), footnote 9. 
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information. Since traits have a top-down effect upon mental-state attributions and action 
predictions, and help us to generate an initial hypothesis about what person will do, it makes sense 
to prioritize trait attribution in the social prediction process. This is not unlike how “gist” 
representations function in visual processing: initial predictions about a scene are the product of 
rapid, coarse-grained representations, which are then updated and filled in as more fine-grained 
information is processed (Bar, 2007; Chaumon, Kveraga, Barrett, & Bar, 2014; Clark, 2015). 
Likewise, spontaneous trait inferences provide our social predictions with an initial gist-like 
representation of a person’s mind, which can then be updated and fine-tuned as we acquire more 
information about their actual mentalistic dispositions. Thus, rapid trait attributions can serve as an 
early scaffold of the social prediction process. 
One might object that this analogy to visual processing is misleading. While gist representations are 
imprecise, they do contain real information about visual scenes; in contrast, spontaneous trait 
inferences based on faces and stereotypes carry no real information about a person’s character. 
Thus, while gist representations provide a reliable baseline for scene processing, the same cannot be 
said for early trait attributions. However, early trait attributions do not need to accurately reflect a 
target’s character in order to help us learn about it. All they need to do is generate predictions. The 
extent to which these predictions match or fail to match their targets creates new information in the 
form of prediction errors, which can be used as feedback to revise the model and generate new 
predictions (Ma et al., 2012; Mende-Siedlecki, Cai, & Todorov, 2013). Much like learning in other 
domains (Gopnik & Wellman, 2012; Perfors, Tenenbaum, Griffiths, & Xu, 2011), learning about a 
person’s character can be characterized an iterative process of prediction, feedback, and updating 
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(c.f. Cunningham et al., 2007). In this manner, even early, inaccurate trait attributions can help us 
acquire knowledge of character in the long run.9 
A consequence of this model is that we should develop increasingly nuanced models of a person’s 
psychology as we come to learn more about them. Consistent with this picture, there is evidence 
that as we get to know a person more intimately, we think about their behavior in a much more 
detailed, mentalistic fashion. Serena Chen observed the emergence of this tendency in a study that 
investigated how people reason about their significant others (Chen, 2003). Chen asked participants 
to each describe the reaction that their significant other, a generic stereotypical individual, and a 
nonsignifcant other would have to a range of situations using “IF…THEN…” prompts (e.g. “IF at 
a party, THEN [Amy talks to everyone]”). Participants were additionally asked to provide 
explanations of these responses, which were coded based on their references to psychological states. 
Chen found that participants tended to provide a significantly higher proportion of psychological 
state explanations for their romantic partners than for the other two social targets, and that people 
were significantly more confident about these explanations. Participants also found it easier to 
generate more descriptions based on psychological prompts (e.g. “IF Amy feels threatened…”) for 
their significant others than for other social targets. These findings are especially significant in light 
of the evidence that romantic partners are also highly accurate in their personality judgments, 
suggesting that these kinds of inferences are supported by more rich and detailed mindreading 
(Connelly & Ones, 2010).  
																																																								
9 Of course, many factors might interfere with this iterative updating process. If one lacks the opportunity to gather 
more information about a target, or the motivation to do so, then one’s early, inaccurate trait attributions are likely to 
persist unchanged. By the same token, the extent to which one is able to learn about a person’s character will be partly a 
function of the evidence one is able to gather, and partly a function of one’s motivations (Westra, 2017).  
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Thus, while our initial impressions of a person are prone to a range of biases, as the attributional 
skeptic points out, these biases simply reflect the early stages of a long-term, mentalistic learning 
process. Early characterological judgments provide an initial guess as to a person’s likely distribution 
of states, but we gather more information and receive feedback on our predictions, this distribution 
is iteratively updated. With increasing experience, this model of a person’s likely mental states should 
provide an increasingly accurate approximation of her actual mental-state distributions – that is, her 
character.10  
4.2. Mindreading or mindshaping? 
There is one element that is absent from this account: the influence of the judge herself upon the target. The 
mindreading framework can sometimes give the impression that our relation to other minds is 
essentially detached and spectatorial (Hutto, 2004). But as judges of character, we do not merely 
observe the behavior of other people in a dispassionate manner: we actively engage with them, and 
are ourselves a part of their environment. Indeed, a consequence of my account is that the best 
judges of character will also be exceptionally important elements of a target’s social circle (think, for 
instance, of the incomparable impact that a parent has upon a child’s life). This opens up an 
opportunity for judges to causally influence the character traits of the targets through their own 
actions. As some philosophers have suggested, many different social practices provide avenues for 
this “mindshaping” to occur: teaching and pedagogy, knowledge transmission through testimony, 
																																																								
10 A reviewer observed that this account seems to tread a fine line between moving from a coarse-grained representation 
of a person’s character traits to a more nuanced one, and overcoming a prepotent tendency to represent a person in terms 
of traits in favor of a more accurate, mentalistic model. This distinction turns on one’s conception of traits. According to 
the account of traits that I start with in section 1, traits are constituted by distributions of mental states; on this view, 
knowledge of character just is knowledge of a person’s likely mental states. If, however, one holds a different theory of 
traits – say, the behavioristic account of traits adopted by situationists (e.g. Doris, 2002) – then this objection would have 
some purchase, as the knowledge acquired through this mentalistic learning process would not then count as knowledge 
of character traits. But insofar as the view of traits that I’ve adopted is empirically well-supported, and also aligns well with 
our folk psychological understanding of traits, this objection does not pose a threat to the current account. 
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punishment and reward, moral praise and blame, and even simple kindness and cruelty all create 
experiences that could influence a person’s attitudes and behavior (McGeer, 2007; Zawidzki, 2013) – 
and, ultimately, her character.11   
The mindshaping hypothesis suggests a final objection to the account that I have been defending. 
Rather than simply developing greater empirical knowledge of a person’s character through careful 
observation, it could be argued that we are in effect making our character trait judgments come true 
through our own interventions, as a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy.12  We are not good judges of 
character because we are good mindreaders, but because we are good mindshapers.  
The idea that our relationships and the people in our lives influence our personalities is obviously 
correct. It would thus be a mistake to discount the idea that judges’ attributions are true in part 
because of their own actions. However, mindshaping cannot explain the broad patterns of accuracy 
in character judgment that we see in the data. For one thing, targets interact with many different 
people in their lives, and tend to have multiple significant relationships. Each of these intimate 
acquaintances will most likely have a distinct impact on the target’s personality. Thus, a judge’s task 
is not simply to predict the impact of her own actions upon the target, but the effects of the actions 
of all the target’s other intimate acquaintances as well. Any advantage in trait attribution brought 
about through mindshaping would thus be negated by the mindshaping activities of other people 
(unless these judges somehow managed to collude to bring about the same characterological end). 
Moreover, one of the signatures of accuracy is convergence among multiple judges’ trait ratings 
																																																								
11 Notably, Alfano has invoked a similar notion to support his fictionalist approach to virtue ethics: by labeling people as 
virtuous, we can actually encourage them to act as though they really do possess those virtues (Alfano, 2013).  
12 This proposal is similar to the oft-cited Pygmalion effect, which purported to show that teachers’ expectations about 
students’ academic performance caused students’ academic performance to improve (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968). For 
a recent critique of this finding, see Jussim (2012). 	
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across the target’s different relationships. This suggests that what explains judges’ accuracy is 
something common across all of their experiences (namely, the character of the target), rather than 
facts about their individual interactions with the target. Finally, while personality is certainly 
influenced by experience, it also has a heritable genetic component, which limits the extent to which 
it could be influenced by mindshaping qua environmental factor (McCrae et al., 2000). Thus, while 
judges are sometimes mindshapers when it comes to targets’ character traits, accurate trait judgment 
will still depend upon reliable mindreading. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper began with a skeptical challenge to our everyday judgments of character and the threat 
attributional skepticism seems to pose to our experiences of knowing other people. By drawing on 
the literatures on accuracy in personality judgment and mindreading, I then sketched out an account 
of why our character judgments can be initially unreliable, as well as the inferential processes that 
ultimately render them more trustworthy. I do not claim that these judgments are reliable across the 
board, or that biases like the fundamental attribution error are morally and epistemically 
unproblematic. But I maintain that broad skeptical worries about character-trait attributions are 
empirically unwarranted. 
In effect, this has been a defense of common sense. Prominent social psychologists and 
philosophers have encouraged us to mistrust our ordinary character judgments, but this has never 
been consistent with our everyday experiences. We are not, for instance, constantly shocked by the 
behavior of our friends and family; cases where people turn out to be very different people than 
their friends and family believed them to be are the exception, not the rule. Such a fact is so 
mundane that we become habituated to it, and eventually forget about it altogether. When this 
happens, it is normal for errors in character judgment to appear highly salient. But skeptical 
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arguments based on such errors must be evaluated against a backdrop of overall reliability. Accurate 
character judgments are common, and they form a baseline for our most meaningful social 
interactions and life plans.  
Acknowledgements 		
Many people provided feedback on earlier drafts of this paper. Special thanks are due to Maria 
Altepeter, Michael Barkasi, James Beebe, Peter Carruthers, John Michael, Christian Miller, Jennifer 
Nagel, Jeremy Reid, Shannon Spaulding, and Haijo Westra for their comments and suggestions. I am 
also grateful to the participants and organizers of the “Character and the Morally Exceptional: 
Empirical Discoveries and Moral Improvement” Interdisciplinary Summer Seminar at Wake Forest 
University, reading groups at the University of Rochester and the University of Toronto, and 
audience members at the 2018 Central States Philosophical Association conference in Buffalo and 
the 2019 APA-Central Division conference in Denver.  
  
	 27 
References 
Alfano, M. (2011). Explaining Away Intuitions About Traits: Why Virtue Ethics Seems Plausible 
(Even if it Isn’t). Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2(1), 121–136. 
http://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-010-0045-9 
Alfano, M. (2013). Character as Moral Fiction. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Ashton, M. C., & Lee, K. (2007). Empirical, theoretical, and practical advantages of the HEXACO 
model of personality structure. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 11(2), 150–166. 
Bach, P., & Schenke, K. C. (2017). Predictive social perception: Towards a unifying framework from 
action observation to person knowledge. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 11(7), 1–17. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12312 
Bar, M. (2007). The proactive brain: using analogies and associations to generate predictions. Trends 
in Cognitive Sciences, 11(7), 280–289. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2007.05.005 
Biesanz, J. C., West, S. G., & Millevoi, A. (2007). What do you learn about someone over time? The 
relationship between length of acquaintance and consensus and self-other agreement in 
judgments of personality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92(1), 119–135. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.92.1.119 
Butterfill, S., & Apperly, I. (2013). How to Construct a Minimal Theory of Mind. Mind and Language, 
28(5), 606–637. 
Chaumon, M., Kveraga, K., Barrett, L. F., & Bar, M. (2014). Visual predictions in the orbitofrontal 
cortex rely on associative content. Cerebral Cortex, 24(11), 2899–907. 
http://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bht146 
Chen, S. (2003). Psychological-State Theories About Significant Others: Implications for the 
Content and Structure of Significant-Other Representations. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 29(10), 1285–1302. http://doi.org/10.1177/0146167203255226 
Choi, I., & Nisbett, R. E. (1998). Situational salience and cultural differences in the correspondence 
bias and actor-observer bias. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24(9), 949–960. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0146167298249003 
Choi, I., Nisbett, R. E., & Norenzayan, A. (1999). Causal attribution across cultures: Variation and 
universality. Psychological Bulletin, 125(1), 47–63. http://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.125.1.47 
Clark, A. (2015). Surfing uncertainty: Prediction, action, and the embodied mind. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Cloutier, J., Gabrieli, J. D. E., O’Young, D., & Ambady, N. (2011). An fMRI study of violations of 
social expectations: When people are not who we expect them to be. NeuroImage, 57(2), 583–
588. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.04.051 
Connelly, B. S., & Ones, D. S. (2010). An Other Perspective on Personality: Meta-Analytic 
	 28 
Integration of Observers’ Accuracy and Predictive Validity. Psychological Bulletin, 136(6), 1092–
1122. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0021212 
Cronbach, L. J. (1955). Processes affecting scores on" understanding of others" and" assumed 
similarity.". Psychological Bulletin, 52(3), 177. 
Cunningham, W. A., Zelazo, P. D., Packer, D. J., & Van Bavel, J. J. (2007). The iterative 
reprocessing model: A multilevel framework for attitudes and evaluation. Social Cognition, 25(5), 
736–760. http://doi.org/10.1521/soco.2007.25.5.736 
Darley, J. M., & Batson, C. D. (1973). “ From Jerusalem to Jericho”: A study of situational and 
dispositional variables in helping behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 27(1), 100–
108. 
Doris, J. M. (2002). Lack of character: Personality and moral behavior. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Epstein, S. (1979). The stability of behavior: I. On predicting most of the people much of the time. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37(7), 1097. 
Fast, L. A., & Funder, D. C. (2008). Personality as Manifest in Word Use: Correlations With Self-
Report, Acquaintance Report, and Behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94(2), 334–
346. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.94.2.334 
Finnigan, K. M., & Vazire, S. (2018). The incremental validity of average state self-reports over 
global self-reports of personality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 115(2), 321–337. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000136 
Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J. C., & Glick, P. (2002). A Model of (Often Mixed Stereotype Content: 
Competence and Warmth Respectively Follow From Perceived Status and Competition. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychologyersonality and Social Psychology, 82(6), 878–902. 
http://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.82.6.878 
Fleeson, W. (2001). Toward a structure- and process-integrated view of personality: Traits as density 
distributions of states. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80(6), 1011–1027. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.80.6.1011 
Fleeson, W., & Gallagher, P. (2009). The Implications of Big Five Standing for the Distribution of 
Trait Manifestation in Behavior: Fifteen Experience-Sampling Studies and a Meta-Analysis. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97(6), 1097–1114. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0016786 
Fleeson, W., & Jayawickreme, E. (2015). Whole trait theory. Journal of Research in Personality, 56, 82–
92. 
Fleeson, W., & Jayawickreme, E. (2017). Challenging Doris’ Attack on Aggregation: Why We are 
Not Left “Completely in the Dark” about Global Virtues. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 20(3), 
519–536. http://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-017-9810-5 
Frankfurt, H. G. (1971). Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person. The Journal of Philosophy, 
	 29 
68(1), 5. http://doi.org/10.2307/2024717 
Friston, K., & Kiebel, S. (2009). Predictive coding under the free-energy principle. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 364(1521). 
Funder, D. C. (1995). On the Accuracy of Personality Judgement: A Realistic Approach. Psychological 
Review, 102(4), 652–670. 
Gilbert, D. T., Malone, P. S., Aronson, J., Giesler, B., Higgins, T., Ross, L., … Trope, Y. (1995). The 
Correspondence Bias. Psychological Bulletin, 117(1), 21–38. http://doi.org/10.1037/0033-
2909.117.1.21 
Goldman, A. I. (2006). Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading. 
Oxford University Press. 
Gopnik, A., & Wellman, H. M. (2012). Reconstructing constructivism: Causal models, Bayesian 
learning mechanisms, and the theory theory. Psychological Bulletin, 138(6), 1085–108. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/a0028044.Reconstructing 
Harman, G. (1999). Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology : Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental 
Attribution Error. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, 99, 315–331. 
Hartshorne, H., & May, M. A. (1928). Studies in the nature of character: Vol. 1. Studies in deceit. New York, 
NY: Macmillan Publishers. 
Helgeson, C. (2013). The Confirmational Significance of Agreeing Measurements. Philosophy of Science, 
80(5), 721–732. http://doi.org/10.1086/673924 
Heller, D., Komar, J., & Lee, W. B. (2007). The dynamics of personality states, goals, and well-being. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33(6), 898–910. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0146167207301010 
Heyman, G. D., & Gelman, S. A. (2000). Preschool Children’s Use of Trait Labels to Make 
Inductive Inferences. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 77(1), 1–19. 
http://doi.org/10.1006/jecp.1999.2555 
Hohwy, J. (2013). The predictive mind. Oxford University Press. 
Hutto, D. D. (2004). The limits of spectatorial folk psychology. Mind and Language. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.0268-1064.2004.00272.x 
Jayawickreme, E., Meindl, P., Helzer, E. G., Furr, R. M., & Fleeson, W. (2014). Virtuous states and 
virtuous traits: How the empirical evidence regarding the existence of broad traits saves virtue 
ethics from the situationist critique. Theory and Research in Education, 12(3), 283–308. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/1477878514545206 
John, O. P., & Srivastava, S. (1999). The Big Five trait taxonomy: History, measurement, and 
theoretical perspectives. In L. A. Pervin & O. P. John (Eds.), Handbook of personality: Theory and 
research (2nd ed., Vol. 2, pp. 102–138). New York, NY: Guilford. 
	 30 
Jones, E., & Harris, A. (1967). The Attribution of Attitudes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 3, 
1–24. 
Jussim, L. (2012). Social Perception and Social Reality: Why Accuracy Dominates Bias and Self-Fulfilling 
Prophecy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Kemp, C., Perfors, A., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2007). Learning overhypotheses with hierarchical 
Bayesian models. Developmental Science, 10(3), 307–321. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
7687.2007.00585.x 
Kenny, D. A. (1991). A general model of consensus and accuracy in interpersonal perception. 
Psychological Review, 98(2), 155–163. http://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.98.2.155 
Kestemont, J., Vandekerckhove, M., Ma, N., Van Hoeck, N., & Van Overwalle, F. (2013). Situation 
and person attributions under spontaneous and intentional instructions: An fMRI study. Social 
Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 8(5), 481–493. http://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nss022 
Koster-Hale, J., & Saxe, R. (2013). Theory of Mind: A Neural Prediction Problem. Neuron, 79(5), 
836–848. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2013.08.020 
Krull, D. S., Seger, C. R., & Silvera, D. H. (2008). Smile when you say that: Effects of willingness on 
dispositional inferences. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44(3), 735–742. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2007.05.004 
Liu, D., Gelman, S. A., & Wellman, H. M. (2007). Components of Young Children’ s Trait 
Understanding : Behavior-to-Trait Inferences and Trait-to-Behavior Predictions. Child 
Development, 78(5), 1543–1558. 
Luan, Z., Poorthuis, A. M. G., Hutteman, R., Denissen, J. J. A., Asendorpf, J. B., & van Aken, M. A. 
G. (2018). Unique predictive power of other-rated personality: An 18-year longitudinal study. 
Journal of Personality. http://doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12413 
Ma, N., Vandekerckhove, M., Baetens, K., Overwalle, F. Van, Seurinck, R., & Fias, W. (2011). 
Inconsistencies in spontaneous and intentional trait inferences. Social Cognitive and Affective 
Neuroscience, 7(8), 937–950. http://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsr064 
Ma, N., Vandekerckhove, M., Baetens, K., Overwalle, F. Van, Seurinck, R., & Fias, W. (2012). 
Inconsistencies in spontaneous and intentional trait inferences. Social Cognitive and Affective 
Neuroscience, 7(8), 937–950. http://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsr064 
McCabe, K. O., & Fleeson, W. (2012). What Is Extraversion For? Integrating Trait and Motivational 
Perspectives and Identifying the Purpose of Extraversion. Psychological Science, 23(12), 1498–
1505. http://doi.org/10.1177/0956797612444904 
McCabe, K. O., & Fleeson, W. (2016). Are traits useful? Explaining trait manifestations as tools in 
the pursuit of goals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 110(2), 287–301. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/a0039490 
McCrae, R. R., Costa, P. T., Ostendorf, F., Angleitner, A., Hrebickova, M., Avia, M. D., … 
	 31 
HrebfEkova, M. (2000). Nature over nurture: temperament, personality, and life span 
development. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78(1), 173–186. 
McGeer, V. (2007). The regulative dimension of folk psychology. In D. D. Hutto & M. Ratcliffe 
(Eds.), Folk psychology re-assessed (pp. 137–156). Springer. 
Meltzoff, A. N., & Gopnik, A. (2013). Learning about the mind from evidence: Children’s 
development of intuitive theories of perception and personality. Understanding Other Minds, 19–
34. http://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.115.197401 
Mende-Siedlecki, P., Cai, Y., & Todorov, A. (2013). The neural dynamics of updating person 
impressions. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 8(6), 623–631. 
http://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nss040 
Milgram, S. (1963). Behavioral study of obedience. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 67(4), 
371. 
Miller, C. B. (2014). Character and moral psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mischel, W. (2004). Toward an Integrative Science of the Person. Annual Review of Psychology, 55(1), 
1–22. http://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.55.042902.130709 
Mischel, W., & Shoda, Y. (1995). A cognitive-active system theory of personality: Reconceptualising 
situations, dispositions, dynamics and invariance in personality structure. Psychological Review, 
12(1), 246–268. 
Nichols, S., & Stich, S. P. (2003). Mindreading: An integrated account of pretence, self-awareness, and 
understanding other minds. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Noftle, E. E., & Robins, R. W. (2007). Personality predictors of academic outcomes: big five 
correlates of GPA and SAT scores. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93(1), 116. 
Ozer, D. J., & Benet-Martínez, V. (2006). Personality and the Prediction of Consequential 
Outcomes. Annual Review of Psychology, 57(1), 401–421. 
http://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.57.102904.190127 
Paris, P. (2016). Scepticism about Virtue and the Five-Factor Model of Personality. Utilitas, 29(4), 1–
30. http://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820816000327 
Perfors, A., Tenenbaum, J. B., Griffiths, T. L., & Xu, F. (2011). A tutorial introduction to Bayesian 
models of cognitive development. Cognition, 120(3), 302–21. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2010.11.015 
Reeder, G. D. (2009). Mindreading: Judgments About Intentionality and Motives in Dispositional 
Inference. Psychological Inquiry, 20(1), 1–18. http://doi.org/10.1080/10478400802615744 
Reeder, G. D., Kumar, S., Hesson-McInnis, M. S., & Trafimow, D. (2002). Inferences about the 
morality of an aggressor: the role of perceived motive. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
83(4), 789–803. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.83.4.789 
	 32 
Reeder, G. D., Vonk, R., Ronk, M. J., Ham, J., & Lawrence, M. (2004). Dispositional Attribution: 
Multiple Inferences About Motive-Related Traits. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86(4), 
530–544. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.86.4.530 
Repacholi, B. M., Meltzoff, A. N., Hennings, T. M., & Ruba, A. L. (2016). Transfer of Social 
Learning Across Contexts: Exploring Infants’ Attribution of Trait-Like Emotions to Adults. 
Infancy, 21(6), 785–806. http://doi.org/10.1111/infa.12136 
Repacholi, B. M., Meltzoff, A. N., Toub, T. S., & Ruba, A. L. (2016). Infants’ Generalizations About 
Other People’ s Emotions : Foundations for Trait-Like Attributions. Developmental Psychology, 52, 
364–378. http://doi.org/dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0000097 
Rosenthal, R., & Jacobson, L. (1968). Pygmalion in the classroom: Teacher expectation and pupils’ intellectual 
development. New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc. 
Ross, L. (1977). The Intuitive Psychologist And His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution 
Process. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-
2601(08)60357-3 
Ross, L., & Nisbett, R. E. (2011). The person and the situation: Perspectives of social psychology. Pinter & 
Martin Publishers. 
Sabini, J., & Silver, M. (2005). Lack of Character? Situationism Critiqued. Ethics, 115(3), 535–562. 
http://doi.org/10.1086/428459 
Seiver, E., Gopnik, A., & Goodman, N. D. (2013). Did She Jump Because She Was the Big Sister or 
Because the Trampoline Was Safe? Causal Inference and the Development of Social 
Attribution. Child Development, 84(2), 443–454. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
8624.2012.01865.x 
Snow, N. E. (2010). Virtue as social intelligence: An empirically grounded theory. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Sripada, C. S. (2012). Mental state attributions and the side-effect effect. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 48(1), 232–238. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2011.07.008 
Sripada, C. S., & Konrath, S. (2011). Telling more than we can know about intentional action. Mind 
& Language, 26(3), 353–380. 
Tamir, D. I., & Thornton, M. A. (2018). Modeling the Predictive Social Mind. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 22(3), 201–212. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2017.12.005 
Theriault, J., & Young, L. (2018). Social Prediction in the Theory of Mind Network. PsyArXiv. 
Thornton, M. A., & Mitchell, J. P. (2018). Theories of person perception predict patterns of neural 
activity during mentalizing. Cerebral Cortex, 28(10), 3505–3520. 
http://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhx216 
Todorov, A. (2013). Making up your mind after 100-ms exposure to face. Psychological Science, 17(7), 
592–598. 
	 33 
Todorov, A., Olivola, C. Y., Dotsch, R., & Mende-Siedlecki, P. (2015). Social Attributions from 
Faces: Determinants, Consequences, Accuracy, and Functional Significance. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 66, 519–545. http://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-113011-143831 
Todorov, A., Said, C. P., Engell, A. D., & Oosterhof, N. N. (2008). Understanding evaluation of 
faces on social dimensions. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12(12), 455–460. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2008.10.001 
Todorov, A., & Uleman, J. S. (2003). The efficiency of binding spontaneous trait inferences to actors 
faces. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39(6), 549–562. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-
1031(03)00059-3 
Uhlmann, E. L., Zhu, L. L., & Diermeier, D. (2014). When actions speak volumes: The role of 
inferences about moral character in outrage over racial bigotry. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 44(1), 23–29. http://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.1987 
Uleman, J. S., Adil Saribay, S., & Gonzalez, C. M. (2008). Spontaneous Inferences, Implicit 
Impressions, and Implicit Theories. Annual Review of Psychology, 59(1), 329–360. 
http://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093707 
Uleman, J. S., Hon, A., Roman, R. J., & Moskowitz, G. B. (1996). On-line evidence for spontaneous 
trait inferences at encoding. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22(4), 377–394. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0146167296224005 
Van Overwalle, F. (2009). Social cognition and the brain: A meta-analysis. Human Brain Mapping, 
30(3), 829–858. http://doi.org/10.1002/hbm.20547 
Vazire, S., & Carlson, E. N. (2011). Others sometimes know us better than we know ourselves. 
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 20(2), 104–108. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0963721411402478 
Vazire, S., Chung, C., Freeman, H., Mehta, P., Baquero, C., Harrison, H., … Beard, S. (2010). Who 
Knows What About a Person ? The Self – Other Knowledge Asymmetry ( SOKA ) Model. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 98(2), 281–300. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0017908 
Watson, G. (1975). Free agency. Journal of Philosophy, 72, 205–220. 
Webber, J. (2007). Character, common-sense, and expertise. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 10(1), 
89–104. 
Wellman, H. M. (2014). Making minds: How theory of mind develops. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Westra, E. (2017, September 26). Stereotypes, theory of mind, and the action–prediction hierarchy. 
Synthese, pp. 1–26. Springer Netherlands. http://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1575-9 
Westra, E. (2018). Character and theory of mind: an integrative approach. Philosophical Studies, 175(5), 
1217–1241. http://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0908-3 
Whewell, W. (1989). Novum organon renovatum. In R. E. Butts (Ed.), In William Whewell: Theory of 
	 34 
Scientific Method,. Indianapolis: Hackett. 
Wimmer, H., & Perner, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of 
wrong beliefs in young children’s understanding of deception. Cognition, 13(1), 103–128. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(83)90004-5 
Zagzebski, L. T. (2017). Exemplarist moral theory. Oxford University Press. 
Zawidzki, T. W. (2013). Mindshaping: A new framework for understanding human social cognition. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
 
